Introduction
In the internet environment, a user can access many resources which are distributed in many different places. In 1981, Lamport proposed a password authentication scheme [2] to provide authentication between a user and a remote server. In a smart card based password authentication scheme, the smart card takes password as input, computes the login message and sends the login message to the server. Many smart card based password authentication schemes with a single server have already been constructed [1, 3] . However, it is impossible to apply the authentication methods in a single server environment to the multi-server environment. Since each user needs to have different passwords with different remote servers in the multi-server environment. Some smart card based password authentication schemes for the multi-server environment are proposed [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] . Those schemes can be divided into two types, namely hash-based authentication and public-key based authentication.
In 2001, Tsaur et al. proposed a remote user authentication scheme based on RSA cryptosystem for multi-server environments [21] . Li et al. applied neural networks to construct an inefficient remote password authentication scheme [4] . Tsaur et al. improved Li et al.'s scheme [18] . However, Tsaur et al.'s improved scheme is still insecure [19] . Juang proposed an efficient multi-server user authentication and key agreement based on hashing function and symmetric-key cryptosystem [20] . But Juang's scheme easily suffers online guessing attacks [21] . Juang's scheme also cannot withstand offline dictionary attacks [6, 22] . Chang and Lee proposed an improved scheme [21] . However, the proposed scheme [21] cannot withstand the insider attack, server spoofing attack and registration center spoofing attack [9] . Hu et al. proposed an efficient multi-server password authenticated key agreement scheme using smart cards [9] . But it does not satisfy the security requirement in the multi-server environment [16] . The scheme in [22] is also insecure [14] . Tsai proposed an efficient multi-server authentication scheme based on one-way hash function without verification table [23] . Unfortunately, some attacks on it are found [14, 15, 16] . Recently, Liao and Wang proposed a secure dynamic ID based user authentication scheme for multi-server environment [13] . Liao-Wang's scheme [13] is still vulnerable to insider attacks, masquerade attacks, server spoofing attacks and registration center spoofing attacks. Furthermore, it fails to provide mutual authentication [14, 15, 24] . Hsiang and Shih proposed a secure dynamic ID based remote user authentication scheme for multi-server environment [24] . Chen, Huang and Chou [14] proposed an improvement on Hsiang and Shih's scheme.
In this paper, we will further demonstrate that Hsiang and Shih's scheme [24] is still vulnerable to off-line password guessing attacks, impersonation attacks, Server spoofing attacks. And it cannot resist against information leakage attacks. We demonstrate that Chen, Huang and Chou's scheme [14] suffers from impersonation attacks, password guessing attacks and server spoofing attacks. In addition, Chen et al.'s [14] can not provide perfect forward security.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Some analyses of two multi-server password based smart card authentication schemes are given in Section 2 and in Section 3, respectively. Finally, conclusion will be given in Section 4.
Hsiang-Shih's scheme

Notations
The notations will be used throughout the paper. U i ：the i-th user ⇒： A secure channel.
S j ：the j-th server → ：A common channel. 
RC
Review of Hsiang-Shih's scheme
Hsiang-Shih's scheme [24] consists of four phases: the registration phase, the login phase, the mutual verification and session key agreement phase and the password change phase.
(1) Registration phase For each server S j with identity SID j , RC computes and sends RS j =H(SID j ||y) to S j . When the user U i wants to access the server S j , U i and RC performs the following procedures to accomplish the user U i 's registration.
Step 1. U i selects a password PW i , an arbitrary number b and computes h(b  PW i ).
Step 2.
Step 3. RC computes
) in a smart card and sends it to the users.
Step 5. U i puts b into his smart card.
(2) Login phase
When U i wants to login S j , U i keys his identity ID i , password PW i and the server identity SID j , the smart card performs the following steps:
Step 1. Compute
H =H i , the smart card allows the user to go on with the login; otherwise, the smart card rejects the login request.
Step 2. Generate a nonce N i and compute: Step 3.
) Mutual verification and session key agreement phase
First, S j initiates the mutual authentication.
Step 1-1. Generate a nonce N jr and compute M jr =h(SID j ||y)  N jr .
Step 1-2. S j →RC:
Next, RC makes responses as follows.
Step 2-1. Compute
Step 2-2. Check if
If it is not so, RC rejects the authentication request and terminates this session. Otherwise, RC generates a nonce N rj and computes
Step 2-3.
After receiving { C 1 , C 2 , N rj }, S j continues the following steps.
Step 3-1. Compute
If it is not so, S j terminates this session. Otherwise, S j computes
Step 3-2. Compute h(B i || A i || N i ), and check if it equals with Q i . If they are not equal, the server S j terminates this session. Otherwise, S j computes
Step 3-3. S j →U i :
When U i receives the message (  ij M , N j ), the user performs the following steps:
Step Step 4-2. Compute
Step 4-3.
Finally, the user U i and the server S j compute the session key SK= h(B i ||A i ||N i ||N j ||SID j ). (4) Password change phase
If the user wants to change his password without the help of RC, the user inserts his smart card into the card reader and keys ID i and PW i . Here we omit the details of the password change phase.
Analysis of Hsiang-Shih's scheme
In the following, we show that Hsiang-Shih's scheme [24] is insecure and it suffers from some attacks.
(1) Information leakage attacks When an adversary intercepts the message transmitted during the communication between the user and the server, and the message transmitted during the communication between the server and the registration center, the adversary obtains 
Here, B i is stored in the smart card and should be kept secret. But the adversary can compute it without access to the smart card.
(2) Off-line password guessing attacks
When an adversary monitors the channel between the user and the server and the channel between the server and the registration center and intercepts all the transmitted messages 
Thus, the adversary can impersonate U i to acquire the service of the server S j .
Step 1. Choose a nonce
Step 2. U i (who the adversary impersonates)→S j :
The server S j sends {M jr , SID j , If a server S j has communicated with a user U i , then the server S j can mount an impersonation attack Because S j has set up a session with U i , S j has obtained U i 's information { B i , A i , T i }. Moreover, S j can compute h(b  PW i ) and h(x  r). Therefore, the server S j can impersonate the user U i to require the service of other servers.
Similarly, an adversary also impersonates the user U i to access the server S j (4) Server spoofing attacks A malicious user U can impersonate a server S j by the following methods. First U computes U i 's information {B i , A i } by applying the approach in Impersonation attacks. When the user U i sends {CID i , P ij , Q i , D i , C 0 , N i } to the server S j , U intercepts them. U chooses a random integer N j and computes
M must be in the right form, so U i thinks that the message is sent by the real server S j In addition, if a user U i has accessed the server S j , then the server S j can impersonate another server S k to communicate the user U i .
Since the user U i has accessed the server S j , the server S j has U i 's information {B i , A i }. Chen-Huang-Chou's multi-server authentication scheme [14] includes four phases: 1)preparation phase, (2)registration phase, (3)login phase, and (4)authentication and session key agreement phase or password change phase. The scheme assumes that RC is trustworthy and stores two secret keys, x and y. All identities of users and servers have public information, e.g. ID i and SID j .
(
1) Preparation phase
In this phase, for each server S j with identity SID j , RC computes and sends RS j =h(SID j ||y) to S j .
(2) Registration phase
When the user U i wants to access the server S j , U i and RC performs the following procedures to accomplish the user U i 's registration.
Step 1. U i selects a password PW i and ID i , and calculates h(ID i ||PW i ).
Step 4. RC issues U i a smart card containing ID i and B. When U i wants to login S j , U i keys his identity ID i , password PW i and the server identity SID j , the smart card performs the following steps:
Step 1. Generate a random nonce c and calculate 
Step 2-1. After receiving the authentication request, RC first checks if ID i and SID j are valid:
Step 2-2. If the above two equations hold, RC computes
After receiving {C 2 , V 2 }, S j continues the following steps.
Step 3-1. Compute 
Step 3-2. Step 4-1. Compute K S  =(N s ) c , and
holds, U i confirms that S j is authenticated.
Step Step 1. Generate a random nonce c and compute
Step 2. 
, and
Step 2 Calculate the session key SK=( N c )
Step 3 S j →U i :{ N s , V }.
After receiving the message from S j , U i computes the session key
Here, we also omit the description of the password change phase in the Chen-Huang-Chou's scheme.
Analysis of Chen-Huang-Chou's scheme
In this section, we show that Chen-Huang-Chou's scheme [14] will suffer from impersonation attacks, password guessing attacks and server spoofing attacks. Moreover, Chen-Huang-Chou's scheme does not hold the perfect forward security.
(1)Impersonation attack 1 If one session key SK between U i the user and the server S j is compromised, and the adversary intercepts the message {C 3 , N s , B c } transmitted during the agreement of the session key. Then the adversary can calculate * j B =B c  SK. Thus, the adversary can impersonate U i to login the server S j with a Flag 'not the first time login' by executing the following operations.
Step 1. Generate a random nonce c and calculate
Step 2. Send {ID i , SID j , C, N c , Flag} to S j , where Flag is set to 'not the first time login'. It is easy to know C=h(h(ID i ||RS j )||ID i ||SID j ||N c ). So the server S j would confirm it was communicating with the user U i .
If an adversary obtains one session key SK between the user U i and the server S j and further impersonate the user U i to login any server, say S j , as follows.
